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31 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members

CIA Long-Range Planning Group Members

Long-Range Planning Issue Team Chairpersons

FROM : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: 1980 CIA Long-Range Planning Project - Summary Report

- 1. Forwarded herewith is a summary report on the EXCOM Long-Range Planning Project for 1980. Prepared by the Executive Committee Staff, the paper summarizes major conclusions reached in the ten issue papers and in Executive Committee deliberations concerning them. The paper consists of key findings; an assessment of the world environment of the 1980s and its intelligence implications; definition of basic problem areas; suggestions for the 1983 Program Guidance; and a forecast of the 1981 planning cycle. (AIUO)
- 2. This first long-range planning cycle has been informative and useful to the Executive Committee. We have benefited organizationally from both the process and from the project of our planning effort. Among these benefits have been the definition of major issues with which the Agency must deal in the 1980s; the systematic consideration of these issues by interdirectorate teams of line managers; and their articulation to CIA leadership at the most senior level. This planning exercise has resulted in the initiation of efforts to obtain substantially increased resources for some major CIA facility and system improvements. Also, although many of the issues presented could not be dealt with individually in this process, we have defined some broader directions for continued management attention. The productivity of this process has been such that I intend to recommend to the incoming DCI that he continue it in a similar but improved manner in 1981. (AIUO)
- 3. Both the Director of Central Intelligence and I thank all of you for your contributions and support to this major and innovative effort. I urge you to express to the participating personnel of your directorates and individual planning team members our positive evaluation of the results of this first annual long-range planning project and our appreciation of their individual contributions. (AIUO)

Frank C. Carlucci

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	SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE LONG-RANGE PLANNING PROJECT		
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INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the trends, assumptions, and implications for intelligence that have resulted from this first annual long-range planning exercise initiated by the Executive Committee. It presents four general issues developed from information presented in the individual issue papers, resource guidance for the FY-1983 CIA program, and directions for next year's planning cycle. (U)

KEY FINDINGS

The results of the long-range planning exercise are expressed as integrated policy-level perspectives of the problems likely to face U.S. policymakers and intelligence managers through the 1980s. These perspectives were generated from the extensive array of problems and assessments presented in the individual Foreign Policy and Management issue papers. The "micro-issues" raised in the individual papers will be handled within the regular Agency resource and budget process. Perspectives, guidance for the Comptroller for the FY-1983 CIA Program, and guidance for the next planning cycle are summarized below:

ance for the next planning cycle are summarized below:	
(1) We are increasingly diverging from our traditional near- single focus on intelligence concerning Communist military strength toward a broader and more complicated range of intelligence topics in a larger number of countries. It is unlikely that we will be able to do all we will be asked to do in the near future without substantial growth in resources, cutbacks in existing lesser priority objectives, or a combination thereof.	
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- (5) These results of the EXCOM long-range planning process will be utilized by the Comptroller for FY-1983 CIA program and budget guidance. In effect, the regular budget process becomes the implementation mechanism for the EXCOM long-range planning decisions.
- (6) The EXCOM long-range planning process will be continued in 1981. We will build and improve on this year's process by better structuring of the issues, a slight increase in EXCOM Staff for this purpose, and more stress on policy-level issues review by EXCOM principals. (S)

THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1980s

This section summarizes the collective assessment of world-wide problems in the 1980s and their implications for intelligence. It was constructed from a detailed review of all the long-range planning issue papers, but draws especially from the Foreign Policy papers. (U)

THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT

- (1) The Soviet Union/East Europe bloc will remain our number one adversary. Soviet behavior will likely become less predictable and will be impacted by:
 - -- transition in its own leadership;
 - internal demographic and economic problems in population, labor supply, energy, industry, and agriculture;
 - -- challenges to the Soviet system arising in East Europe; and
 - -- increased challenges in the Third World by China and the West. (S)
- (2) Sino/U.S. and Sino/Soviet relations will continue much as they are now unless impacted by a major crisis in the areas mentioned above. We should not, however, take China for granted. We expect that:
 - -- Chinese modernization efforts will continue to expand, but slowly;

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- -- China's leadership will be tested internally as the aging leadership is replaced; and
- -- there will be closer Sino/Japanese relations. (S)
- (3) Our traditional allies will show an increasing degree of independence due to:
 - -- conflicting economic interests;
 - -- differences over relations with the Soviet bloc; and
 - -- a growing desire for independence from U.S. leadership. (S)
- (4) The Third World will pose increasing problems for the U.S.:
 - -- chances for abrupt inimical changes will increase;
 - -- challenges to U.S. interests will require varying responses because the Third World is not a homogeneous entity; and
 - -- priorities of U.S. interests in various parts of the Third World may change rapidly. (S)
- (5) There will be strong concern over world-wide trends in resources, technology and economics, including:
 - -- intense competition for scarce resources;
 - -- more competition for U.S. manufactured goods at home and abroad from foreign made items;
 - -- concern for foreign technology breakthroughs;
 - -- worry over the proliferation of nuclear capability;
 - -- slow world GNP growth; and
 - -- world-wide demographic trends. (C)
- (6) The United States will be influenced by:
 - -- a stronger need to compete politically and economically around the world;
 - -- a desire not to be viewed by the world as a major obstacle to world peace;
 - -- concern over our competitive position in the world;
 - -- access to resources around the world; and
 - -- the desire to prevent political blackmail from threats of conventional, terrorist, economic or nuclear warfare. (S)

